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Search Query Privacy: The Problem of
Anonymization
by RON A. DOLIN, J.D., PH.D.
I. Introduction
A. The Nature of the Problem
Search queries may reveal quite sensitive information about the
querier. One can imagine the potentially compromising nature of
queries and result clicks: a spouse looking up STD's; a student
seeking free copyrighted music or video downloads; someone
inquiring about nuclear bomb or other WMD technology; a citizen
posing questions about a political group within a country that
disfavors or forbids it. Even though most queries are not directly
associated with a particular person, corresponding identifying
information can often be sufficient to figure out who the querier is,
which can create a trail of sensitive information.
While most search engines have policies that protect users'
privacy to some degree,' search queries and other user-generated
content have been the subject of governmental, private, and
international discovery.2 As a result, many countries have initiated
* Ph.D. in Computer Science. Disclosure: the author worked several years at
Google as an engineer before leaving for law school, and maintains an interest in the
company; the viewpoints here are the author's, not necessarily shared by Google. The
author would like to thank Prof. Robin Feldman, Prof. Mark Lemley, and Frank Cusack
for their valuable feedback on this work. An extended abstract of this article appeared in
the Proceedings of the Intelligent Privacy Management Symposium, TECHNICAL REPORT
SS-10-05 1, 59-65 (Privacy 2010 Symposium, March 22-24, 2010, Stanford University,
California).
1. See, e.g., Google.com, Privacy Center, http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
2. For example, after the Federal Courts struck down the first version of the Child
Online Protection Act in 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice sought search queries from
the four leading search engines in order to establish the percentage of searches related to
pornography - only Google fought the subpoena. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties
Union v. Gonzales, 478 F.Supp.2d 775 (E.D. Penn. 2007); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234
[137]
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policies that seek to protect these queries. In particular, there has
been a strong push to force search engines to delete and/or
anonymize these data after a few months so that they are not
available for later discovery or other uses. However, these data can
be quite useful for many reasons, and some search engines have been
reluctant to follow this method of privacy protection.
When a user enters search terms in an internet search engine, the
query terms are logged by the search engine. In addition to the query
terms, the log data includes items such as the type and version of the
user's web browser, IP address, and various "cookie" information.
Cookies, viewable in most web browsers within "options" or
"preferences", are used to allow the search engine to keep track of
some information associated with a user that is not sent by the web
browser with the query, such as prior queries issued from the same
browser, the user's email account if signed in, etc. Anonymization
generally consists of deleting cookie information and either
completely or partially removing the IP address such that it can not
be traced back to an individual machine.
There is a growing demand in the U.S. for search query
anonymization, as discussed in a New York Times article from 2008:
F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Wikipedia.com, Child Online Protection Act Overview,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChildOnlineProtectionAct (last visited Apr. 23, 2010);
GoogleBlog, Judge tells DoJ "No" on search queries, http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2006/03/judge-tells-doj-no-on-search-queries.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In
another well-known case, Viacom was able to obtain YouTube queries in an attempt to
argue that the YouTube website is used pervasively for illegal music and video downloads,
although both sides agreed to anonymize the queries prior to the data being handed over
due to the ensuing public outcry. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Google Told to Turn Over User
Data of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2008, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/07/04/technology/04youtube.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). Finally, in another
(in)famous case, Yahoo data was used by the Chinese government to identify and convict
a journalist in 2004. (Yahoo released the identity of the holder of an email account - not
search related). See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Lawmakers Blast Yahoo Executives for Helping
China Jail Dissident, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2007, at A-i, available at http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/11/07/MN2NT7C99. DTL (last visited April 23,
2010).
3. See, e.g., JBE, Google in dispute with EU data protectionists about retention of IP
addresses, THE H, Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.h-online.com/news/Google-in-dispute-with-
EU-data-protectionists-about-retention-of-IP-addresses--/110192 (last visited Apr. 23,
2010); TRK, Google resists further regulation on retention of search query data, THE H,
Apr. 9, 2008, http://www.h-online.com/news/Google-resists-further-regulation-on-
retention-of-search-query-data--/110501 (articles from 2008 discussing the differences of
opinion between Google and the EU regarding data retention, anonymization, and the
privacy implications of IP addresses).
4. See discussion in Section VI, infra (The anonymization of zip codes by removing
the last 2 or 3 digits is similar to the anonymization discussed here).
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Yahoo's new data retention policy is the most restrictive among
major search engines in the United States and will most likely
put pressure on rivals like Google and Microsoft to shorten the
time they keep information about their users.
It comes at a time when some privacy advocates are planning a
renewed push for legislation that would regulate the data
retention and online advertising practices of Internet
companies, which they say has a stronger chance of passing with
a new Congress and president in Washington.
Already Representative Edward J. Markey, a Massachusetts
Democrat who is chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, praised Yahoo for
setting a new privacy standard.'
"I urge other leading online companies to match or beat the
commitments announced by Yahoo," Mr. Markey said in a
press release.
Privacy, however, is not the only issue one should consider here,
nor is anonymization necessarily the right solution to the set of
problems faced. This article sets out several issues suggesting that the
push toward anonymization and deletion is ill-conceived. This article
also suggests borrowing from, and adding to, other data protection
schemes, such as that used for health records, that serve to maintain
long-term information. Such an approach seeks to enforce privacy
through data protection, balancing privacy concerns with other
factors such as the long-term usefulness of the data and problems
associated with data destruction.
B. Overview
As background, Section VI discusses several types of existing
data protection referred to in the main sections. First, it introduces
several schemes used in the U.S. The U.S. approach has been
somewhat piecemeal, as evidenced by the different acts and
requirements for different types of data (e.g., census, health, financial,
5. Representative Markey is no longer the chairman of the committee at the time of
this writing.
6. Miguel Helft, Yahoo Limits Retention of Search Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008,
at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/technology/internet/18yahoo.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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and communications data). Each data type involves different
protection schemes, with some kept completely confidential (e.g.,
census data), some allowing for criminal prosecution if leaked (e.g.,
census and health data), some requiring probable cause and a search
warrant (e.g., electronic communications in transit), and some being
permitted to be sold to third parties unless the individual "opts out"
(e.g., financial data).
Within the E.U., there is a more comprehensive approach
established under Directive 95/46/EC, on "the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data."' It is often referred to as the "data
protection" directive. However, since directives are not self-
executing, each E.U. member country has implemented the Directive
differently.' While the details of the various implementations are
beyond the scope of this article, the Directive itself establishes an
important framework that is applicable to all forms of data. In
particular, the Directive established an ongoing advisory committee,
the so-called Article 29 Working Party (established by the Directive's
Article 29), which is tasked with dealing with ongoing issues of
specific types of data, resolving ambiguities, and so forth." In 2008,
the Working Party released WP148, its "Opinion 1/2008 on data
protection issues related to search engines."" Given the
comprehensive nature of that document, it provides a convenient and
comprehensive perspective arguing for search query data
anonymization.
Using WP148 as a backdrop, Section II presents several
arguments for keeping the search query data intact instead of
7. Council Directive 95/46,1995 OJ. (L 281) (EC) 1, 1.
8. See, e.g., Peter Fleischer, Lead Data Protection Authority, http://peterfleischer.
blogspot.com/2009/02/lead-data-protection-authority.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
9. See, e.g., Peter Fleischer, Launching another "global" forum to talk about privacy,
http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2009/01/launching-another-global-forum-to-talk.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010) and 30th Int'l Conference of Data Protection & Privacy
Comm'rs, Resolution on the urgent need for protecting privacy in a borderless world, and
for reaching a Joint Proposal for setting International Standards on Privacy and Personal
Data Protection, (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.lda.brandenburg.de/sixcms/media.
php/3509/resolution international standards-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010 (discussing
other international efforts to harmonize data protection regulations).
10. Council Directive 95/46, art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) ("Working Party on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data" establishes the
independent committee with advisory status).
11. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008).
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anonymizing them. The list includes factors such as the potential
usefulness of the data; exceptions such as criminal investigations;
registered vs. non-registered use; the purpose for the data collection;
and data ownership. These arguments serve as counterweight to the
orientation of WP148, which focuses almost exclusively on privacy.
This focus may lead one to conclude that deletion is the best solution,
and the point of Section II is to highlight that such a solution comes at
a cost. By viewing anonymization as half of a trade-off, we can step
back and see if the protection approaches we take for other forms of
data might be adequate to protect search query data, and, if so, allow
us to simultaneously protect privacy while benefiting from the
continued use of the data. Section III briefly outlines one such
approach, borrowing from other data protection schemes in an
attempt to delineate boundaries such as which stakeholders might be
responsible for which roles. That is, what might be considered the
proper role for governments, business development, engineering, and
users, in order to maximize the protection/use trade-off. Section IV
argues that in one way or another, each stakeholder has contributed
to the call for anonymization, potentially against their own interests,
and what they might do differently to safely allow for the realization
of the vast hidden potential of the data's long term storage.
II. Anonymization Problems
The universal reason to anonymize search engine query logs,
given both domestically and internationally, is to protect the privacy
of the users. Perhaps the most detailed argument given from that
vantage point is the Article 29 Working Party report WP148,
discussed infra. However, there are many arguments that run counter
to that perspective. In presenting some of them, I do not attempt to
stay within a framework of the law of the United States. Although in
some cases American case law is on point and helps to delineate the
issues, other cases are more aligned with a European perspective. I
use WP148 as a framework to present anonymization arguments due
to its comprehensive nature, not because it is a European approach. 12
Taken as a whole, the arguments reinforce each other in such a way
that they highlight the problems with anonymization and bring to
light the trade-offs that are being made in the name of privacy.
12. In addition, the Working Party is derived from Council Directive 95/46, 1995 OJ.
(L 281) (EC), which is not self-executing. The details of the implementation of that
Directive, quite varying from country to country, is beyond the scope of this article.
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The following arguments are an attempt to present one side -
that of retaining the information. The text often uses interchangeably
the terms anonymization and deletion. The reason is that
anonymization of search query data entails deletion of certain pieces
of information associated with the actual search query terms, such as
IP addresses.
A. Data Usefulness
Enforcing privacy through anonymization comes at the cost of
losing any benefit derived from the use of non-anonymized data. In a
nutshell, it is difficult to overstate the vast number of potential uses
for search query information, which are limited only by one's
imagination. The data are not only valuable to the user individually,
but also to the search engine, the government, and society at large.
Uses include the improvement of current tools, the development of
new ones, the predictive power through data analysis, and the
compelling historical, statistical, and scientific potential down the
road.
For an individual, a registered search history can be an aid to
search results and help reduce irrelevant advertising. It can help
differentiate ambiguous terms on an individual basis (e.g., jaguar -
car vs. cat); help with personalized spell corrections and term
substitution; indicate which languages someone has used; and aid in
determining appropriate levels of filtering for profanity, sexual
content, etc.
Search query data are used to improve the search algorithm, as a
defense against "malicious access and exploitation attempts," to
ensure system integrity (e.g., preventing click fraud), and to protect
users (e.g., preventing spam, phishing, etc.)." IP addresses and
cookies are important in all of these. Here is how Google has
described some of the benefits of using this data:
One place we use these models is to find alternatives for words
used in searches. For example, for both English and French
users, "GM" often means the company "General Motors," but
our language model understands that in French searches like
13. Youtube, Peter Fleischer on Privacy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
JNulOtkWrOY (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). For more details see Google, Using data to
help prevent fraud, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/using-data-to-help-pre vent-
fraud.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); Google, Using log data to help keep you safe,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/using-log-data-to-help-keep-you-safe.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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seconde GM, it means "Guerre Mondiale" (World War),
whereas in STI GM it means "G6nie M6canique" (Mechanical
Engineering). Another meaning in English is "genetically
modified," which our language model understands in GM corn.
We've learned this based on the documents we've seen on the
web and by observing that users will use both "genetically
modified" and "GM" in the same set of searches.
Queries are not made in isolation-analyzing a single search in
the context of the searches before and after it helps us
understand a searcher's intent and make inferences. Also, by
analyzing how users modify their searches, we've learned
related words, variant grammatical forms, spelling corrections,
and the concepts behind users' information needs. (We're able
to make these connections between searches using cookie
IDs-small pieces of data stored in visitors' browsers that allow
us to distinguish different users . .
For society at large, consider the following example from
Google. Flutrends detects regional flu outbreaks two weeks before
similar detection by the CDC by analyzing flu-related search terms
such as "flu" or "influenza" in coordination with the geographical
region as determined by IP addresses (though the data are
anonymized prior to release in a similar way to census data).' The
work is accurate enough to have warranted publication in the well-
known science journal Nature." As discussed in Section II(D), infra,
IP addresses can frequently yield geographical information down to
the city or zip code level without identifying a user's identity. In
principle, knowledge of a coming local flu outbreak can give people
advance notice to get flu shots, wash hands more, etc., which can save
lives. This tool was developed by looking over 5 years worth of non-
anonymized data.
Another example, perhaps just for curiosity, is what people are
searching for in your local area." However, imagine looking for a
14. Paul Haahr & Steve Baker, Official Google Blog, Making search better in
Catalonia, Estonia, and everywhere else, Mar. 25, 2008, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.
com/2008/03/making-search-better-in-catalonia.html (last visited April 23, 2010).
15. Google.org, Explore flu trends around the world, http://www.google.org/
flutrends/; see Section VI(A)(2), infra.
16. Jeremy Ginsberg, Matthew H. Mohebbi, Rajan S. Patel, Lynnette Brammer,
Mark S. Smolinski & Larry Brilliant, Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine
Query Data, 457 NATURE, 1012 (2009).
17. See, e.g., San Francisco within last 7 days: http://www.google.com/insights
/search/# (select "Locations" under "Compare by:"; then select "United States"
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signal that would indicate pending economic problems, such as a rise
in several regions' queries about foreclosures or bankruptcies, and
imagine detecting that signal early enough to prevent a national or
international economic crisis. It would require several years worth of
data to be able to detect such a signal with sufficient reliability to be
able to act on it. How many jobs or retirement funds could
potentially be saved?
Imagine comparing the spread of early domesticated plants and
animals with the spread of ideas today. In Guns, Germs, and Steel,
for example, Pulitzer Prize-winner Prof. Jared Diamond concluded
that the east/west orientation of Eurasia facilitated a much faster
spread of early agriculture than the north/south orientation of the
Americas due to the corresponding similarity of climate in the former
case as opposed to the latter." What is the online equivalent for the
spread of ideas-urban/rural? Do ideas show up in web pages before
or after they show up in queries, and how does this map region by
region? How do virtual communities map to geographical ones?
If census data tells us who and where we are, then search queries
tell us what we're thinking. Imagine what one could study with 100
years of search query data - non-anonymized. The assumption that
such data are expendable is questionable at best, and certainly an odd
determination to leave to the government; we give up a lot of value
by deleting them rather than securely keeping them around.
As discussed in Section VI(A)(3), infra, credit information is
stored in order to protect lenders and the financial system - that is,
the collective. We keep data about an individual with bad credit, to
his detriment, in order to facilitate a functional financial system, and
to improve its efficiency. The individual who cannot get a loan due to
his (accurate) bad credit has no control over the data's storage. In the
case of search query data, when used as intended, there is no
detriment to anyone in order to benefit the collective. This is similar
to our treatment of census data, even though that data collection is
compulsory, while for search queries it is voluntary. The trade-off we
make here in the name of privacy is the loss of the vast potential
usefulness of the data. If they can be kept intact safely, however, the
apparent dichotomy goes away.
"California" "San Francisco" under "Locations:"; then select "Last 7 days" under
"Filter:").
18. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL (W.W. Norton 1997).
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B. Exceptions to Deletion
Not surprisingly, Directive 95/46/EC, which authorized the
creation of the Article 29 Working Party that authored WP148, lists
several exceptions to the policy of data deletion. In general, the
directive requires that data be collected, used, and/or retained only
for "specified, explicit and legitimate purposes."'9  However,
exceptions are provided for "processing of data for historical,
statistical or scientific purposes .. . provided that Member States
provide appropriate safeguards." 20) Other exceptions are found under
the Exemptions and Restrictions section, including national security,
defense, public security, criminal prosecutions, and even "breaches of
ethics for regulated professions." 2' The question here is whether
search query data might qualify for any of these exceptions, and, if so,
what to do about it.
Arguably, national census data would fall under the exception
category given their strong historical, statistical, and scientific
significance. As discussed in Section VI(A)(1), U.S. census data date
back to colonial times and seem to retain detailed identifying
information, consistent with the European framework of allowing
such data to be retained given their nature, even though their
collection is compulsory.22 It could be argued that there is important
historical, statistical, and scientific significance to search query data,
especially if they are associated with geographical location. This
would be true even if IP addresses are not reliably identifying - they
are still often sufficient to determine a city.2 The potential usefulness
of these data for these purposes is discussed Section II(A), supra.
The point here, though, is that a reasonable argument could be made
that these data qualify as having strong historical, statistical, and
scientific significance. To the degree that they do, this would argue
against anonymization of the data in storage, rather than anonymizing
only the access.
19. Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(l)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 48.
20. Id.
21. Council Directive 95/46, art. 13(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42.
22. This highlights the distinction between anonymized access and anonymized
storage, further discussed infra Section III, since, although the identifying information
seems to be retained, census data is publicly accessible only in anonymized form (through
the Bureau's API, published reports, etc.).
23. The issue of whether or not IP addresses and cookies are reliably personally
identifying is discussed infra, dealing with registered vs. non-registered users.
5 -DOLIN -SEARCH QUERY PRIVACY THE PROBLEM OF ANONYMIZAIION- AM 5-13.DO x (DO NOT DELETE)5/14/2010 9:25:02 AM
146 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:2
Other potential exceptions for which search query data might
qualify are national security and criminal investigations. As
mentioned in Section II(D), infra, European telecoms and ISP's are
mandated by Directive 2006/24/EC to store call and connection data
for up to two years under the national security and criminal
investigation exceptions of Directive 95/24/EC.24 The issue for this
section is simply whether search query data are likely to have value
from such a perspective.2 I distinguish national security from
criminal prosecutions under the assumption that the former is more
motivated by crime prevention while the latter is more concerned with
procedural safeguards. Thus, if fishing for information is permitted
for national security, I assume that that would not necessarily require
the production of admissible evidence for the purposes of criminal
prosecution. Under this model, I separate whether search query data
might be useful in aiding the detection and prevention of, say,
terrorist activities where probable cause may not be available, from
the more controlled search and seizure activities associated with
criminal investigation and prosecution.
As an example, consider the case of the threatened attack of the
U.C. Hastings campus in 2007:
24. Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC) makes reference in its
preamble (4) to "safeguard[ing] national security (i.e. State security), defence, public
security or the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or
of unauthorised use of the electronic communications systems" from Council Directive
2002/58, art. 15(1), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 46 (EC), which in turn cites the exceptions in
Council Directive 95/46, art. 13(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC). for the same reasons.
25. In particular, a major concern in this regard seems to be the potential for
governmental abuse of the data. If we cannot trust the government not to abuse this data,
however, what is to stop them from capturing the data in transit when the queries are
originally issued, or secretly mandating that the data be forwarded to them for storage
elsewhere prior to anonymization? Safeguarding the information against abuse for
criminal prosecutions could be facilitated by a legal framework similar to the exclusionary
rule for any illegal search or seizure. As will be discussed in Section III, the legal
framework could work against using the data for fishing for typical criminal activity, while
still making it available for the prevention of terrorist attacks and/or adequate criminal
subpoenas under a probable cause model. In any case, it is a somewhat odd argument that
we should force the destruction of property not because we are concerned with abuse by
the property owner, but with abuse by the government. That is, the government does not
trust itself with this data, but it does with census, tax, and health information. As
discussed infra, companies have an incentive, and perhaps an obligation, to fight spurious
subpoenas for search query data, though perhaps they have not come to realize that yet.
26. I am not trying to argue for or against particular activities that might be employed
for national security; rather, I am only discussing whether search query data might be
sufficiently useful to such activities to qualify for exception purposes.
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On April 18, 2007, two days after the Virginia Tech massacre,
an individual under the moniker "Trustafarian," a first-year law
student at UC Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law,
[anonymously] posted the following message in an AutoAdmit
thread titled "Just decided not to do a murder-suicide copycat
at Hastings Law":
Date: April 18th, 2007 1:35 PM
Author: Trustafarian
I went to bed all set for "Bloody Wednesday," but when I
woke-to sun, to flowers in bloom-I just couldn't bring
myself to suit up.
Maybe tomorrow; I hear rain's in the forecast.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread id=616215
&forum id=2#7956138)
The posting was later edited by the poster to read "wgwag," (as
it currently reads now) which stands for "White Girls With
Asian Guys," in an attempt to make it appear as if the original
posting were intended as a joke.
Hastings College of Law, acting on the advice of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, cancelled [sic] classes and evacuated
the building at 3:22PM.
The website used for this posting, AudoAdmit, does not log IP
addresses in order to maintain the anonymity of its users.2 8 One could
argue that in the case of such postings, any information that might
lead to the identity of the poster could help either prevent a
potentially tragic act or determine if the posting was a hoax in order
to prevent needless disruptions at schools, airports, etc. If search
history is relevant in these cases, as one imagines it could be (e.g.
searches for weapons, WMDs, airline schedules, etc.), IP addresses
and search cookies could help connect the dots.29 In the case of
27. Wikipedia, AutoAdmit: U.C. Hastings Evacuation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
AutoAdmit#U.C._Hastings-evacuation (last visited on April 23, 2010) (citations
removed).
28. David Margolick, Portfolio.com: Two Lawyers Fight Cyber Bullying, http://www.
portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-
Bullying (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
29. AutoAdmit is also involved in a well-known defamation case, Margolick, supra
note 28. However, since searches by their nature are not posted, the relationship between
defamation and anonymized logging is beyond the scope of this article. See Doe v. Cioli,
611 F.Supp.2d 216 (D. Conn. 2009); see also Wall Street Journal Online, http://online.wsj.
com/public/resources/documents/aaComplaint.pdf.
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terrorism, the value of this information might not be realized for
months or even years. As with the historic, statistical, and scientific
value, IP addresses and search cookies are useful even though they
are not, in and of themselves, reliably identifying.
Whether for the historic, statistical, or scientific value, or to aid
in national security or criminal investigations, access to search query
data arguably could be helpful and may well qualify as a valid
exception. If so, then these standard exceptions would be consistent
with the other arguments that the data should be retained intact.
C. Anonymization is Unnecessary
Assuming that search query data are useful in some way, are
there frameworks for protecting intact data so that anonymization is
unnecessary? Section III, infra, provides one possible framework for
protecting intact search query data. It is not by any means the only
possibility, as evidenced by the various approaches discussed in
Section VI, infra. Like health data, it assumes that search query data
are sensitive but less desirable to criminals than financial data, and
that they will remain in long-term storage. Like census data, it
differentiates between anonymous storage and anonymous access.
Like electronic communications, it assumes that a warrant should be
required for unauthorized access. It proposes criminal liability for
knowingly giving data to unauthorized persons. It even suggests that
the "identifying" information be physically and logically segregated
from the rest of the data. The point is, though, that many forms of
data protection are available that would serve to minimize the
possibility of unauthorized disclosure while allowing for the benefits
of improved service, innovation, and an invaluable historical record.
By our defining a reasonable data protection standard on search
query data, search engines could keep the data if they view them as
sufficiently valuable to warrant the protection costs. That is likely a
proper boundary between governmental regulation and market
forces.
D. The Many Faces of IP Addresses - Registered vs. Non-registered
Users
Another reason that anonymization is unnecessary is that actual
identification is left as an option to the user. IP addresses and cookies
are less revealing than many privacy advocates acknowledge. They
become reliably identifying only in cases of a registration, something
that users can choose to avoid by performing searches without first
logging in.
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To clear out or correct search histories - for non-registered
users - WP148 states that users can validate that they created the
searches via ownership of the relevant IP address, by showing proof
from their access provider that they owned the relevant IP address at
the time of the search:
Search engines should respect the rights of data subjects to
access, and where appropriate to correct or delete information
held about them. These rights apply foremost to the data from
authenticated users stored by search engines, including personal
profiles. However, these rights also apply to non-registered
users, who should have the means to prove their identity to the
search engine provider, for example, by registering for access to
future data and/or with a statement from their access provider
about their use of a specific IP address in the past period about
which access is requested.-o
IP addresses alone are not sufficient to reliably identify a user's
searches for at least two reasons: multiple users and multiple
locations. The first reason, the case of multiple users of the same IP
address, is exemplified by a public computer, say at a library. There,
many people use the same computer, and thus share the same IP
address. A new cookie may be generated each time the web browser
is re-opened after a prior user closes it, allowing the search engine to
detect a possible change in user. However, without an actual
username/password login, no actual identification is facilitated. The
second reason that an IP address alone may be insufficient to track a
user's queries, multiple locations for the same user, is exemplified by
someone using the same laptop from different locations. A user may
scatter his queries across multiple IP addresses, some of which he may
own, some not. Again, without cookie information, and, in particular,
an actual login, the user would not have access to his complete search
history via IP address data alone.
IP addresses are still informative, however, as they can often be
mapped to a small geographical region such as a county or zip code
without requiring any non-public information. Here is an example
from two free geolocation services (as of March 15, 2010):
30. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4,2008)1, 23 (emphasis added). Given
that the search data are expected to remain confidential, it is not clear what purpose is
served by allowing non-registered users access to prior searches.
5 -DOLIN -SEARCH QUERY PRIVACY THE PROBLEM OF ANONYMIZAIION- AM 5-13.DO x (DO NOT DELETE)5/14/2010 9:25:02 AM
150 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:2
Geolocation Service #1 - http://www.geobytes.com/
IpLocator.htm?GetLocation
Geolocation Service #2 - http://www.melissadata.com/lookups/
iplocation.asp
For a Stanford University IP Address [171.64.1.134]:
Service #1 came back with Palo Alto, CA, with a 99% certainty.
Service #2 came back with Stanford University.
For a U.C. Hastings IP Address [209.233.180.24]:
Service #1 came back with San Francisco, CA, with a 92%
certainty.
Service #2 came back with San Francisco.
Search engine map information could also help associate IP
addresses with physical locations to a reasonable degree of accuracy.
Assume for the sake of argument that it is possible to identify at least
a city or zip code from most IP addresses without having to get any
third party information (e.g., from an ISP). While this might be
useful for better searches, as discussed in Section 11(A), supra, it
creates problems under an assumption that an IP address personally
identifies a user, as in the following hypothetical scenario.
Suppose a cafe owner wants to snoop into one of his customer's
searches performed on the customer's laptop using the cafe's wireless
access.' The owner contacts the search engine, validating that he
owns the cafe's IP address, and reviews the search history originating
from the cafe. Under this model, any valid IP address owner could
similarly monitor the searches passing through the routers in their
house, in their business, at their school, etc. 32
31. A typical setup is that a router at a business or in a home is given a public,
dynamic IP address (that is, the external IP address might change from time to time). All
the connections from internal computers to the external internet pass through the router,
which assigns a local IP address to each internal computer. The only IP address seen by
the outside world is the public one assigned to the router by the ISP, and the router keeps
track of which incoming traffic should go to which local computer. Thus many computers
can share the same external IP address simultaneously, making it impossible to know
which local computer was involved in a given communication without knowing how the
router handled internal addressing.
32. This goes well beyond listening in on the network. A user is free to use
encryption between their computer and a search engine (assuming for the sake of
argument that the search engine allows encrypted searching). In this scenario, though, the
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By assuming that an IP address safely identifies an individual,
WP148 would open up more personal information than would be
protected by deleting old IP addresses. IP addresses alone are simply
not, in and of themselves, reliably personally identifying. Similarly, a
user cookie is not reliably identifying.7 From a privacy perspective, it
is problematic to allow access to search histories based on that
information alone. The right to review records should require at least
a username and password - that is, be available only to registered
users and their corresponding registered queries.
If IP addresses and user cookies for non-registered users are not
reliably identifiable, then there is little need to delete them. For
registered users, the search engine can directly associate the searches
to the user, by the user's choice, and the IP addresses and cookies are
not as determinant as the user's account information for identification
purposes. In this case, though, there is no reason for the search
engine to delete the data - the users should be able to do it
themselves directly, if so desired, using their usernames and
passwords. In this manner, users can decide when to issue
anonymous queries by first logging out, or deleting queries after-the-
fact if they forgot to logout in advance. In either case, anonymization
is unnecessary.
WP148, however, argues that if data can ever be used to identify
someone, then they should be deleted.3 This is a very high burden
for any web site operator that logs IP addresses, as most do, and this
requirement is not followed elsewhere. Clearly census data, health
data, financial data, etc., are kept for decades, and much of that
eavesdropper goes to the search engine and simply identifies himself as the owner of the
IP address and is then given full unencrypted access to all searches originating there.
33. For example, public access computers may allow many people to reuse the same
cookie for non-registered users. Similarly, a cookie that has never been associated with a
particular person via a login is probably less identifying than the associated IP address.
34. See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/1 1/technology/internet/l google.html
("Google will be the first major company to give users the ability to see and edit the
information that it has compiled about their interests for the purposes of behavioral
targeting.") (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
35. WP148 states that although "IP addresses in most cases are not directly
identifiable by search engines, identification can be achieved by a third party." The Data
Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search
Engines, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008)1, 8. And then, quoting WP136, it goes on to
state that unless a service provider can guarantee "with absolute certainty" that users
cannot [ever] be identified by their IP address, "it will have to treat all IP information as
personal data, to be on the safe side." Id.
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contains personal identifiers." As discussed in Section VI(A)(2),
infra, describing the handling of U.S. medical data, the standard for
identification there is that the data might reasonably be associated
with an individual. Presumably the justification for the higher
threshold for search query data (allowing for differences between the
U.S. and the E.U.) might be a perception that they are more sensitive,
or that the data are not needed, or that their usefulness does not
warrant the perceived risk of keeping them. All of these reasons,
however, are questionable, as discussed elsewhere in this article. If a
reasonableness standard is sufficient to define personally identifying
information, as a justification for the long-term retention of sensitive
health information, it is difficult to justify the use of a much more
stringent standard for search query data.
Ironically, though, another E.U. Directive, 2006/24/EC,
mandates that European telecoms and ISPs keep records of all
connections for up to two years, including phone numbers, locations,
and/or IP addresses - even for unanswered calls.3 Presumably these
data are stored with the same level of protection as is required for
health or financial data. If these private telecoms and ISPs are able to
safely and confidentially store IP address information and conform to
legal requirements, there is no reason to assume that the search
engines would be any less capable of doing the same.
E. Anonymization is Ineffective
Anonymization is not only unnecessary, but also ineffective.
There are broader issues related to internet privacy that society must
solve in general. Without such solutions, search query anonymization
is ineffectual; with such solutions, it is largely unhelpful.
It does not necessarily make sense to try to fix issues related to
user privacy website by website or service by service, since many
relate to the web in general. These include the following:
36. See Section VI(A)(3), infra (discussing that financial data seems to be stolen
much more frequently than health data. If the reason is due to the criminal desirability of
the former compared to the latter, then search queries are not likely to be a primary target
either.).
37. The Directive mandates the retention of "data necessary to trace and identify the
source of a communication." 2006/24, art. 5(1)(a), 2006 O.J. (L 105) (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriSeiv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010). This was brought about for national security reasons after the
London subway terrorist bombings in 2005; see, e.g., http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4527840.stm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). National security is discussed in Section
I1(B), supra.
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- cookie use, management, and transparency (best handled in
the browser)
- potential abuse of subpoenas, both 3rd party and
governmental
- general logging of cookies and IP address information by all
web sites
In addition, some search history is just inherently revealing, as
demonstrated by the release of millions of "anonymized" AOL
queries, following which the press was able to track down the identity
of a user anyway. 9 Thus even anonymization does not fully solve the
problem. Some may argue that, as a result, all query data should be
immediately deleted (as impractical as that may be). However, a
better argument may be that that (any) retained data should be given
proper protection, rather than assuming that anonymization solves
the problem, or even significantly helps. Since protection must be in
place anyway in order to accommodate persistent personal data
where deletion is not an option (e.g. email), anonymization is not
necessarily the appropriate focus of privacy concerns.
As an example, in the section on "Some issues to be solved by
industry" related to cookies, WP148 states the following:
Persistent cookies containing a unique user ID are personal
data and therefore subject to applicable data protection
legislation. The responsibility for their processing cannot be
reduced to the responsibility of the user for taking or not taking
certain precautions in his browser settings. The search engine
provider decides if a cookie is stored, what cookie is stored and
for what purposes it is used. Finally, expiration dates of cookies
set by some search engine providers seem to be excessive. For
instance, several companies set cookies that expire after many
years. When a cookie is used, an appropriate cookie lifetime
should be defined both to allow an improved surfing experience
and a limited cookie duration. Especially in view of the default
settings of browsers, it is very important that users are fully
informed about the use and effect of cookies. This information
should be more prominent than simply being part of a search
38. See, e.g., Warshak v. U.S., 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), further discussed
in Section IV, infra.
39. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zellar Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher
No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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engine's privacy policy, which may not be immediately
apparent.
These problems are endemic to the web, and search query
anonymization will not solve them. Browser defaults need to be set
appropriately so that they help with privacy immediately upon
installation. For example, cookies should be deleted when the
browser is closed. The fact that some cookies are persistent and
unviewable, or that tracking-cookies monitor a user's activities and
give the information to a third party for marketing purposes, seems
much more of a concern to user privacy than having IP addresses or
cookies stored in search query logs. 4 1 Security and user privacy would
be greatly enhanced by transparent cookie use, a simple and
prominent cookie management tool in the browser, and appropriate
defaults for the novice user.
Another problem is the potential overuse or abuse of subpoenas
to obtain search query data, as mentioned in Section II(B), supra.
However, to reiterate here, if the problem is that we cannot trust the
government, what would stop them from grabbing the information in
transit and storing it anyway? If the problem is one of how the
government or others might use the data, then we need a legal regime
that restricts how the data can be used, including in civil cases.
Anonymous access is not the same as anonymous storage, as
exemplified by the use of the census data. The general problem of
discovery of search query data is not so different from access to any
other confidential information, whether it be email, library searches,
medical history, etc. The problem would be better addressed by
reining in allowable uses, rather than by attempts at anonymization.
Again, anonymization or deletion will not solve the problem for any
persistent data, and a viable legal framework needs to address the
wider problem anyway.
Solving these problems would go a long way toward improving
online privacy in general, and, in addressing them, allow for much
greater search query privacy as well, without requiring data
destruction.
40. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, Section 5.3, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) 1, 19-22
(emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection
Issues Related to Search Engines, Section 3, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008), discussion
regarding "flash cookies."
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F. The Marketplace of Trust
Assuming that the data are useful and that anonymization is both
unnecessary and ineffective, the proper solution to privacy may best
be left, at least in part, to the market. As previously mentioned, in
2005 the U.S. Department of Justice sought a week's worth of
anonymized user queries from AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google
as part of its (unsuccessful) attempt to restore the Child Online
Protection Act - ostensibly for the purpose of showing how many
queries were related to pornography. Only Google fought the
subpoena in court. In explaining their reasoning during an interview
with ABC, Larry Page, Google's co-founder, stated that Google
relies on having the trust of our users and using that
information for that benefit. That's a very strong motivation
for us. We're committed to that. If you start to mandate how
products are designed, I think that's a really bad path to follow.
I think instead we should have laws that protect the privacy of
data, for example, from government requests and other kinds of
42
requests.
All three major search engines provide services such as email and
chat. Arguably, the information contained in those conversations can
be equally sensitive and private to the information found in search
queries. And yet, no one argues that we should mandate that those
conversations get deleted out of privacy concerns. Rather, we select
companies based on our trust that they will keep such information
private. Many factors may go into a user's selection of a particular
search engine, such as the response time, the search result quality, the
user interface, and the usefulness of the advertising. A reasonable
consideration is also the level of trust that a user has regarding the
search engine's handling of the user's privacy.
It seems rational that a company might seek to differentiate itself
by showing that it cares about maintaining a user's trust. Although
anonymization might be one valid method, using search history to
improve query results while visibly fighting subpoenas is equally
valid. Given that the search engines also have data that their users
want them to store indefinitely, such as email, one could argue that
the latter is a better indicator of an overall protection scheme than
the former, since deletion says nothing about how a company will
42. ABC News, Bob Woodruff Reports From Inside the World of Google, Jan. 20,
2006, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1526798 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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handle the data it keeps. A race to anonymization, whether it is 18
months, 6 months, or 2 days, might not be as convincing as developing
best practices, including, say, public data protection audit ratings.
Perhaps the differentiation is best left to the market to work out,
under a framework of adequate data protection, rather than by
imposing a particular solution, anonymization, on all the participants.
G. Collection Purpose
It is worth addressing the argument that anonymization is
needed in order to prevent data from being used for a different
purpose than that for which they were originally collected. The
problem with this perspective is that it is not based on privacy. So
long as the data are not being exposed to any additional parties, there
is no privacy justification against repurposing.
Directive 95/46/EC highlights the importance of collecting, using,
and retaining data for its "specified, explicit and legitimate"
purpose.4 WP148 summarizes the purpose restrictions as follows:
In accordance with Article 6 of the Data Protection Directive
[95/46/EC], personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully;
they must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not be processed for purposes incompatible with
the purposes for which they were originally collected.
Moreover, the processed data must be adequate, relevant and
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and/or further processed. For any personal data
processing to be lawful, it needs to satisfy one or more of the six
grounds for legitimate processing set out in Article 7 of the said
44Directive .
The aforementioned grounds include, for example, that the user
has "unambiguously given his consent,"45 or that the processing is
"necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller." 46  This begs the question - what constitutes such
legitimate interests? How broadly or narrowly are they interpreted,
who should decide, and what is an appropriate doctrinal basis for
answering these questions?
43. Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
44. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, Section 5, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008)1, 15-22.
45. Council Directive 95/46, art. 7(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
46. Council Directive 95/46, art. 7(f), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) (emphasis added).
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In the process of analyzing the purpose of the data used by
search engines, WP148 discusses some of the purposes given to them
47
by several search engines in response to a survey. These purposes
include improving the service, securing the system, fraud prevention,
law enforcement, etc. WP148 then discusses each in turn and comes
to the following conclusion: "the Working Party does not see a basis
for a retention period beyond 6 months." 48 As previously discussed,
WP148 is used here as a comprehensive overview of many or most of
the objections given to long-term or indefinite retention of non-
anonymized search query data. As such, it is worth highlighting some
of those objections in the context of a purpose-based argument in the
hopes of extracting a possible basis for a legal doctrine that might
allow for indefinite data retention. The general finding of the
Working Party is summarized in the introduction to the section
dealing with their analysis of the purpose of the non-anonymized
search query data:
Generally, search engine providers fail to provide a
comprehensive overview of the different specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes for which they process personal data.
Firstly, some purposes, such as 'improvement of the service' or
'the offering of personalised advertising' are too broadly defined
to offer an appropriate framework to judge the legitimacy of
the purpose. Secondly, because many search engine providers
mention many different purposes for the processing, it is not
clear to what extent data are reprocessed for another purpose
that is incompatible with the purpose for which they were
originally collected.49
This is a case of a rejection of data retention due to a purpose
being declared as "too broadly defined." Furthermore, it seems that
mentioning different purposes for the same data, something that
might be considered efficient from an engineering perspective, is
somehow discouraged.
47. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "Questionnaire for Search Engines on Privacy Policies," Annex
2, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) 1, 28-29.
48. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "Search Engine Provider Obligation," Section 8, WP148,
00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) 1, 25.
49. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "Analysis of Purposes and Grounds by the Working Party,"
Section 5.2, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4,2008) 1, 16-88 (emphasis added).
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As WP148 deals with more details, more problems arise. For
example, WP148 argues that more explicit consent can be construed
from registered than non-registered users.5o But if by consent we
mean that users agree to use their information to answer a search
query, then it is difficult to see how registration would matter.
Assuming that the terms of service are the same for both registered
and non-registered users, than the issuing of a query by its nature is a
consent. Since, as discussed in Section II(D), supra, non-registered
search queries arguably can not reliably identify a user, it is unclear
what the problem is with retaining that data.
WP148 goes on to state that "it is the opinion of the Article 29
Working Party that search queries do not need to be attributable to
identified individuals in order for them to be used to improve search
services."" However, as discussed in Section II(A), supra, and
Section 11(I), infra, some type of identification is required to be able
to track query reformulation across a query session. Furthermore, to
the degree that IP addresses help in identifying a geographical region,
that information might be very important for some forms of "local
search" technology such as finding a nearby restaurant. The language
of WP148 includes a dismissal of claims made by search engines that
they need the data for accounting purposes.52 However, accounting
for costs among the billions of daily searches and billions of dollars
requires cross-checking between various components of a large
distributed system (e.g. checking that search data matches advertising
data). It is complicated, and there is a lot of room for various forms
of monitoring, validation, detection, fraud prevention, etc. It is not
clear that the search engines are overstating the need for the data, or
on what facts the Working Party bases their dismissal. In dismissing
the need for the data for law enforcement, WP148 states the
following:
Moreover, large amounts of personal data in the hands of
search engine providers may encourage law enforcement
authorities and others to exercise their rights more often and
50. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "-Consent-" subsection, Section 5.2, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4,
2008) 1, 16-17.
51. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "Legitimate Interest" subsection, Section 5.2, WP148,
00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) 1, 17-18.
52. Id.
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more intensely which in turn might lead to loss of consumer
confidence.
This argument is, in effect, a government telling search engines
to delete data because one cannot trust the government.54 It goes on
to tell search engines how best to succeed in the marketplace, which,
as discussed in Section II(F), supra, might be something best left to
the search engines to decide for themselves. The document goes on
to state that "the Working Party considers that a reduced retention
period will increase users' trust in the service and will thus constitute
a significant competitive advantage."5 Again, this seems to cross the
boundary between a regulation based on protecting privacy into the
realm of advice for competition in a marketplace. Moreover, if all
search engines are forced to have the same short retention period,
there would be no competitive advantage anyway.
The justification for anonymizing data is to protect user privacy,
and any forced deletion of information should be grounded on that
basis. When there is disagreement between the views of regulators
and industry regarding the purposes for which the data are used, such
discrepancies should be resolved within a framework of privacy
protection. In that regard, one doctrine that might be valid is that a
stated purpose be interpreted broadly so long as it does not extend
the user's zone of access control. In other words, under an
assumption of adequate data protection, if there is a reasonable
interpretation of a stated purpose that is consistent with a proposed
data use, then it should be allowed so long as doing so does not
expose the data to a third party that would not otherwise have had
access under a narrower interpretation.
If a company discovers an interesting new application from its
existing data, the issue is whether that application results in sharing
the data with anyone who would not have had access to personal
information beforehand. For example, if a search engine is able to
use search history to help with map lookups, and the data are shown
53. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, "Legitimate Interest" subsection, Section 5.2, WP148,
00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) 1, 17-18.
54. Granted, though, that it might well be one government not trusting the actions of
a different government. In any case, as pointed out supra, note 25, it is a somewhat odd
argument that we should force the destruction of property not because we are concerned
with abuse by the property owner, but with abuse by the government.
55. The Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, Section 5.3, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4,2008) 1, 19-22.
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only to the registered user, who is given the option to opt in or out of
the new application, no one is harmed - no extra data sharing has
taken place.
WP148 interprets restrictions of purpose as an argument to force
data anonymization and deletion once the original narrowly
interpreted purpose is completed. For example, use of personalized
search query data to answer a query is fine, but using that same data
to improve search results over several years apparently is not, let
alone using the data in completely new ways and new applications.
As with the other arguments, this perceived problem goes away under
a model of adequate data protection, in which the data are stored
intact and no more access is granted than had been allowed under the
narrowly defined purpose. The cost of deletion in this case is not just
quality of service, but innovations that could be as compelling and
irreplaceable in the future as basic search has become today.
H. Whose Data Are They Anyway? - An American Constitutional
Perspective
When a user searches for information, the query data gets
logged. Although some of the data may pertain to the user, who is
the proper "owner" of the log entry data? If governments impose
data deletion as a privacy solution, should they have to compensate
the search engines for the destruction of a valuable asset?
In the context of the user voluntarily giving the IP address and
cookie, as is the case, the search engine has a proprietary right to
record the information. Why does the user pass information such as
IP address in the first place? Because the search engine has to know
where to send the answer - to which machine. In fact, all the
information that the search engine gets from the user may impact the
search result content or format. For example, different browsers
might have different capabilities and require different formats to
display the results in the same way as other browsers. Similarly, a
search cookie might help personalize search results. The search
engine is simply recording the information sent by the user. That
56. There might be an issue related to the value of the data. If someone gives
information about themselves for one purpose, and a business uses it for an additional
(albeit internal) purpose, the user might have a valid objection in terms of compensation.
That is a contract issue, not a privacy concern. Another aspect of this is that of using the
data in anonymized form in a new application. However, that is beyond the scope of this
article since there are no privacy implications with such use, and pre-anonymization would
allow the same use anyway.
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information was given to them by the user in order to obtain the best
search results.
It could be argued that such information is the rightful
intellectual property of the search engine, in the same way that a
medical clinic has the right to keep records of treatments given - in
case of a claim of malpractice, to allow a doctor to review what she
did in the past, to allow the clinic to audit procedural compliance,
and, finally, to look at the aggregate of all the records to see which
treatments worked best.
From a legal perspective, does the fact that information held by
an entity is "about" a person give that person an inherent right to
control the information? That is, is "aboutness" a property right, not
just a privacy right?" One scenario is someone taking a photograph
of another in a public place, or just writing down one's own thoughts
about another, where the other person might not have any knowledge
of the notes. Perhaps a more salient perspective is in situations where
the information held is actually harmful to someone. Imagine the
case of a person with a criminal record where a potential employer
wants to know about it. A more common case is where a credit
agency has (accurate) information about a person's bad credit.
Perhaps the person would like that information deleted. We certainly
cannot argue that we keep the information around to benefit him, but
rather to protect lenders in an attempt to maintain an efficient
financial system. We often allow someone to correct mistakes, say in
credit information and criminal records. But we do not always allow
even that - say in the case of non-public personal notes. Even for
public writings, someone would only have cause to correct mistakes in
cases of defamation, but not have the right to delete or alter personal
observations by others that are factually correct (e.g., journalism).
However we view it, there seem to be many instances in which
"aboutness" does not translate to an ownership right, and data
privacy is subject to a balancing of factors relative to which
information we want others to be allowed to have about the object of
the data (the "data subject" in E.U. terminology).
Assuming that search engines are proper owners of the data,
search logs constitute a trade secret in that they are kept secret and
derive value from their secrecy . In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
57. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. R.
1125, 1170-71 (2000).
58. The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
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the U.S. Supreme Court held that the uncompensated taking of a
trade secret by the EPA was unconstitutional:
[Trade-secret] property right is protected by the Taking Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Despite their intangible nature, trade
secrets have many of the characteristics of more traditional
forms of property. Moreover, this Court has found other kinds
of intangible interests to be property for purposes of the
Clause.
It is challenging to imagine another context in which the
government has the right to force an entity to throw away its
property, rather than regulate the use of that property, at least
without the corresponding right of adequate compensation for the
loss. The Court in Ruckelshaus found that:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" is one with which
this Court has wrestled on many occasions. It has never been
the rule that only governmental acquisition or destruction of the
property of an individual constitutes a taking. . . ."
The issue of a regulatory taking in this context is beyond the
scope of this article, but the issues are interesting from an IP
perspective." However, allowing for data protection, rather than
forced deletion, avoids this problem altogether.
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939).
59. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984).
60. Id. at 1004 (emphasis added). Based on the Court's wording, it seems that
property destruction is assumed to be an obvious taking.
61. As mentioned, one issue is whether the search engine is a rightful owner of their
log data from a takings perspective. Another issue is whether forced deletion of the data
would qualify as a per se taking. Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), it would qualify if all economic value was removed, and under Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), it would likely qualify under
the concept of permanent dispossession of the property. Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) gives factors to consider in deciding the point at
which regulatory restrictions become a taking, including the "economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," as well as "the character of the
governmental action." An important consideration is whether we would view the deleted
data as independent, constituting 100% loss of property, or whether we would view the
lost data as a component of the overall log data, constituting only a partial loss of the
property's value. While a rational basis test is sufficient for a taking (Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469,
487-88 (2005)), Penn Central implies that the point at which a regulation becomes a partial
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I. Queries as User-Generated Content - A Moral Rights Perspective
Ironically, even the assumption that the user (co-)owns the data
does not remove the problems caused by anonymization. At some
point, complex query sessions become copyrightable user-generated
content, and are thus subject to the moral rights of attribution and
integrity.
Suppose that I investigate a research topic, spending an hour or
more trying a few search queries, exploring the results, revising the
queries, etc. For the purposes of illustration, I investigated the
question of whether any of the Tuskegee Airmen were Jewish. I
added some intentional misspellings and typos. It turned out to be a
bit of a challenge to get an answer. For example, I could not find any
data that gave the religious breakdown of the group. In the end, I
came across a reference to one member who described himself as "a
little Jewish," but found that by substituting "Judaism" for "Jewish"
and then switching to searching through books rather than web pages:
Example Google query session (abridged): were any of the
Tuskegee Airmen Jewish?6 2
tuskegie airmen
tuskegee airmen
<http://www.usnationalhistoricsite.com/>
<http://www.tuskegeeairmen.org/>
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TuskegeeAirmen>
tuskegee airmen reliion
tuskegee airmen religion
tuskegee airmen jewish
<http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2009/01/unex
pected-opportunity-tuskege.html>
taking has to be viewed under a reasonableness standard. Under Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928), the government can force destruction of property without compensation.
It is not clear, though, how that would be viewed if alternate solutions were available, or if
there were not near 100% certainty of a nuisance or problem (in that case, treating rather
than destroying fungus-infested trees; in this case, protecting rather than deleting data).
Finally, another issue is whether or not a regulation that the data must be deleted, known
in advance of the collection of the data, changes the anticipated value of the data going
forward. In this case, the data must be collected, and all parties agree that it must be
available for at least some number of months (for fraud detection, protection against
DDOS attacks, etc.). Under Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), pre-existing
regulations are not exempt from takings claims. The concept of a forward-looking
governmental payment per deletion is consistent with the government paying rent for use
of part of a private property, which is not uncommon.
62. Each line represents either a query or a clicked-on URL. Indented lines are
quotes from a given web page.
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<http://www.blackjew.net/2009/01/barack-obama-invites-
tuskegee-airman-to.html>
<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1232292897063&pa
gename= JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>
<http://www.tuskegeeairmen.org/uploads/AirmanVisitsRockwo
odCenter.pdf>
<http://ems.gmnews.com/news/2009/0225/bulletin-board/010.ht
ml>
tuskegee airmen biography jewish
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-DavisBOJr.html>
<http://bajanreporter.blogspot.com/2009/01/barbadian-
everywhere-one-of-tuskegee.html>
<http://blackhistorypages.net/pages/tuskair.php>
<http://www.southplainfield.lib.nj.us/homeworklinks/biography.
htm>
<http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/articlelive/articles/3994
8/1/Tuskegee-Airmen-facts/Pagel.html>
tuskegee airmen religionlreligious statistics
<http://www.josephgomer.com/>
<http://www.sandomenico.org/page.cfm?p=921>
<http://tuskegeeairmen.org/TuskegeeAirmenHistory.html>
<http://tuskegeeairmen.org/uploads/nameslist.pdf>
<http://www.mcall.com/news/local/election/la-me-tuskegeel8-
2009janl8,0,26561.story>
"The Vietnam War in the 1960s was the first conflict to
which the United States sent an integrated fighting force.
[.. .] While Christianity was still the dominant religion
among African-Americans within the military ranks, the
institution had to accommodate its black soldiers' other
religions, including Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism."
Encyclopedia of Religion and War - Google Book Search,
http://books.google.com/books?id=WZdDbmxe-a4C&pg=PA6
8&dq=tuskegee+airmen%7Cairman+religion%7Cjew%7Cjewi
sh&ei=XCizSeLZL4PKkQTtxbyqDg#PPA68,M1 p. 68 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
[moved to Google book search]
tuskegee airmenlairman jewljewishljudaism
"George Spencer Roberts was born in Fairmount, West
Virginia, on September 24, 1918. He described himself as,
'Indian, black, Caucasian, a little Jewish."'
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<http://books.google.com/books?ei= 1CuzSYfSD4_AlQTS1Yy3
Dg&id=LY9TAAAAMAAJ&dq=tuskegee+airmenlairman+je
wljewishljudaism&q=tuskegee+airmenlairman+jewljewishljudai
sm&pgis=1#searchanchor>
Suppose that a search engine wanted to publish a book of their
1,000 most interesting query sessions. Ignoring for the moment the
privacy issue, would the company need to ask the users for permission
to do so strictly from a copyright perspective? If so, at the point at
which copyright attaches to the query session, moral rights would
presumably also attach - in particular, the rights of attribution
(authorship) and integrity (non-destruction). If so, then
anonymization or deletion initiated by the search engine should be
precluded, since stripping a work of its authorship or destroying a
work is contrary to these rights.
When does content become copyrightable? Generally, although
laws vary between countries, there needs to be sufficient originality.
While there is little debate that users own a copyright to their
uploaded photographs, what about text they enter in a blog or on a
friend's social networking page? While in general we may assume
that email is copyrighted, information entered into forms is more
complicated. For example, filling out one's name does not seem to
carry with it a threshold level of originality. Similarly, a search query
in isolation may be somewhat simple - "Tuskegee Airmen." But a
series of queries taken as a whole, or in conjunction with a series of
web page clicks (which may or may not be logged, depending on the
search engine), might constitute a very unique form of expression. As
we go from a simple "navigational" query such as "coca cola
company" to a complex interaction involving query revisions, spell
corrections, synonym expansions, image or map clicks, etc., the query
session probably becomes sufficiently original to warrant copyright .
Moral rights are inherent to a work. In some countries, rights
such as attribution are not alienable/negotiable. Even in the U.S., the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA") provides for attribution
63. Further issues here include whether it matters that the content is generated in the
context of functionality, though technical manuals and computer programs might fall
under the same category and they are clearly copyrightable. Another issue is whether it
matters if there was an intent by the user to ever display the "work". However, moral
rights such as authorship would attach regardless of publication. Moreover, not only is
there no requirement to register works for copyright to attach, but also if anyone else were
to attempt to publish the work, the author's permission would likely still be required.
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and integrity rights of visual artwork, including the preclusion of
destruction or mutilation of certain pieces.64  International
agreements under TRIPS (optionally) extend these rights to other
copyrightable works.
If we assume that moral rights attach to some query sessions,
what might be the obligations of the search engine to protect them?
For example, should it be required to maintain a copy, and, if so, for
how long and under what conditions? We expect companies that
store our email to keep it around, at least until the account is no
longer active. But that expectation, and associated limitations, comes
from a contractual agreement under the terms of service. In this case,
the expectation derives from an inherent, non-negotiable right as a
result of the creation of the content in the first place. In general,
users do not maintain an independent copy of their search history.
An additional interesting aspect of moral rights into the digital
domain is that copies are identical. What does destruction mean in
that context? Perhaps one way to view it would be to infer a notion
of "last known copy". From this perspective, if someone believes or
has reason to believe that they have the last digital copy of a work for
which integrity attaches, they would be obliged to maintain the work.
Note that without the identifying information, it is impossible to
string a query session together since there is no way to track which
individual queries were issued from the same source. They become
a series of independent elements - like cutting up poetry into
individual phrases. Even simple analyses such as discovering
common term replacements or the contextual meaning of
abbreviations is less accurate outside a query session model. In the
context of moral rights, though, the loss of capability to view a query
session as a single unit destroys the ability to reproduce the user-
generated content. Thus forced anonymization is antithetical to a
moral rights perspective.
Another issue arises pertaining to registered vs. non-registered
users. Strictly speaking, moral rights attach to the creation of the
work regardless of whether the search engine knows who the author
is, as would be the case, say, with a book's author using a pseudonym
64. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
65. World Trade Organization, Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
66. Query logs are generally recorded chronologically, possibly among thousands of
search engine machines, which may then be merged into a central logging system. I do not
assume that a user's queries, even within a single multi-query session, are handled by the
same set of machines at the search engine.
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(though presumably the publisher knows whom to pay). For the non-
registered user, the IP address and search cookie associated with the
query session are still valid. While they might not serve to inform the
search engine about the identity of the author, they could in principle
serve as protection against anyone else claiming authorship to the
degree that the information can rule out a user who could not have
had the IP address associated with the work. To the degree that a
non-registered user's IP address and search cookie are not
identifying, there is no reason to delete the information under the
guise of protecting privacy. Thus, as before, a moral rights
perspective would argue for keeping all the information to the degree
that it aids in protecting the rights of attribution and integrity, and
where that information serves no such purpose, the argument for
deletion vanishes anyway. However, as with prior arguments, this
apparent dichotomy goes away under a framework of protecting data
rather than deleting it.
III. An Alternate Framework - HIPAA++
There are several factors to be considered in deciding on the
minimal level of protection needed for search query data protection.
One important issue is the fact that the E.U. and many in the U.S. are
calling for anonymization within a few months of data collection,
which would tend to push the data protection scheme toward a high
level of security. Directive 95/46/EC allows for the use of "adequate"
protection for non-E.U. members. Thus, in principle, a framework
67. Council Directive 95/46, art. 25(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) requires that the non-
E.U. country "ensures an adequate level of protection." Note, however, that the Data
Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search
Engines, Section 4.1.2, WP148, 00737/EN (Apr. 4, 2008) claims jurisdiction over search
data even in cases where the search query is passed to machines located outside the E.U.
for processing. One justification given is that browsers perform some computation, and
therefore some data processing goes on in the E.U. There are two potential flaws with this
argument. First of all, whatever processing occurs on a personal computer happens prior
to sharing the result of that processing with the search engine and it is not under the
control of the search engine. Thus there is no relevance of such processing to the data
given to the search engine. Second, computations done automatically and indirectly are
no different than the processing that takes place in a video display control card. There are
all kinds of processing that take place within a computer that the user does not directly
initiate. Another jurisdictional justification is that the search engine front end machines,
situated in Europe, generate a user cookie, and that that qualifies as personal data
processing. These cookies, however, are sent to both registered and non-registered users,
and, as has been discussed supra, Section II(B), are not in and of themselves personally
identifying. It is difficult to see how generating a cookie is any more relevant to
jurisdiction than is underlying network processing. The personalization happens only by
associating the cookie with a registered user, which does not happen in the process of
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in the U.S. that sufficiently safeguards search query data could be
made to meet E.U. standards. This proposal uses health data as a
model, since it has little financial desirability, can be very sensitive in
nature, is not allowed to be given to third parties without an
individual's authorization, and provides for legal sanctions for
unauthorized disclosure.
The point of the framework, though, is to assign roles and
distribute decisions. Certainly data deletion is one solution to the
problem of protecting privacy by minimizing the possibility of
disclosure." However, assuming that there are other solutions, one
approach is to let the government decide on the level of sensitivity
and/or desirability of the data, and then mandate certain minimum
security procedures for a given level of sensitivity. A company that
wants to store the data can then decide if the cost of safeguarding the
information at or above the minimum requirement is worth the
perceived value of retaining it. This minimizes the role of the
government from determining data usefulness and purpose beyond a
broad area such as "medical use" or "information intermediation".
Instead, the government's role is in assessing the sensitivity of the
information and the level of threat or criminal interest (e.g., identity
theft, espionage, terrorism, etc.). In this model, if we assume that
medical information is more or less equally sensitive to search query
information, and that their disclosure desirability are roughly
equivalent, then there is little reason to impose a particular solution
on one and not the other just because the government does not find
the latter useful to keep around. Thus we do not want to set the level
of protection unreasonably high in an attempt to force deletion, since
that solution would not accommodate persistent sensitive information
in general, such as medical data.
Legal Framework Suggestion - HIPAA++:
- Search query data (non-anonymized) should be held to no
higher protection standard than medical data - that is, the
simply generating a cookie. It would be like saying that generating a timestamp justifies
jurisdiction. For a different perspective on jurisdictional approaches, see the Canadian
framework: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Processing
Personal Data Across Borders, http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/
gldab_090127_e.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
68. Remember that the data have to be stored for a few months for several reasons
such as click fraud and DDOS detection, and thus disclosure is possible during that
window. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, there is the possibility of capturing the
data in transit or making illicit copies prior to deletion. The only reliable way to protect
queries is not to make any in the first place. Beyond that, there are no 100% solutions.
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protection standard should be determined by the sensitivity and
theft/disclosure desirability, not by the use or (narrow) purpose.
- No release of data to third parties without specific opt-in
authorization
- Anonymized access, not anonymized storage.
- Presumption of non-identification: IP addresses should not be
considered as reliably identifiable in and of themselves.
Similarly for non-registered cookies.
- Discoverability: data limited to criminal cases with a showing
of probable cause. 9
- Mandatory employee training, compliance officers, and data
protection audits.
- Agency and individual civil claims, punitive damages, criminal
liability.
Technical Framework Suggestion (e.g. HIPAA/NIST):
- Segregate and encrypt personally identifying data.
- Non-personal data maintains pointers to personal data.
- Access via an API with appropriate access control restrictions.
- Full monitoring of access to personal data.
This skeletal suggestion is simply to give an example of a
framework that provides a reasonably high level of data protection.
One way or another, reasonable protection is possible without
anonymization.
IV. Shooting Ourselves in the Foot
A. An Interesting Case Study
There has been ongoing litigation regarding the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA")"o allowance of government ex parte
searches of email without probable cause; if not for a finding of lack
of ripeness, it very well might have been found unconstitutional in
Warshak v. U.S. by the Sixth Circuit (as it was, both facially and as
applied, in the 3-judge panel prior to the en banc hearing).' In that
case, the government declined to notify the suspect about the email
searches for one year, well past the statutorily-required 90-day
maximum. In throwing out the constitutional challenge, the court
69. If excluding the use of these data for civil purposes seems extreme, keep in mind
that doing so is less drastic than actual deletion.
70. Discussed in Section VI(A)(4), infra.
71. Warshak v. U.S.,, 532 F.3d at 521.
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presented an interesting perspective on a user's right to expect
privacy and the role of service providers:
Think of just one of these moving parts-the variety of internet-
service agreements and the differing expectations of privacy
that come with them. An agreement might say that a service
provider will "not . . . read or disclose subscribers' e-mail to
anyone except authorized users." United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F.1996) (describing testimony about
AOL's then-existing policy). An agreement might say that a
service provider "will not intentionally monitor or disclose any
private email message" but that it "reserve[s] the right" to do so
in some cases. See Privacy Statement for Juno Members,
http://www.juno.com/legal/privacy.html (last visited July 7,
2008). An agreement might say that a service provider "may or
may not pre-screen Content, but ... shall have the right (but
not the obligation) in [its] sole discretion to pre-screen, refuse
or move any Content that is available via the Service"-as indeed
Warshak's Yahoo! account did. JA 89, 163 n. 3. An agreement
might say that e-mails will be provided to the government on
request-as indeed the same Yahoo! account did. An agreement
might say that other individuals, besides the recipient of the e-
mail, will have access to it and will be entitled to use the
information in it. See, e.g., JA 208 (explaining that Gmail, a
service provided by Google, gives users "an enormous amount
of storage capacity . .. in exchange for . .. terms of service
which say that Google is allowed .. . [to] take a look at the
content of [users'] e-mail and . .. target advertising at [users]
accordingly"). Or an agreement might say that the user has no
expectation of privacy in any of her communications. See, e.g.,
JA 207 (government counsel explaining that "every day when
we log into our e-mail account, we agree that we have no
expectation of privacy in the account"). 2
The dissent made a compelling rebuttal:
The majority adequately recites the facts, but conveniently
leaves out what I believe to be an essential element of the case.
As the majority correctly states, § 2703(d) allows a court to
issue an order based on less than probable cause, allowing the
government to search a suspect's email communications stored
with an electronic service provider for more than 180 days.
Typically, in order to effect such a search, the Stored
Communications Act requires the government to notify the
suspect of the search. However, § 2703(b)(1)(B) allows the
72. Warshak v. U.S., 532 F.3d 521 at 527.
5 -DOLIN -SEARCH QUERY PRIVACY THE PROBLEM OF ANONYMIZAIION- AM 5-13.DO x (DO NOT DELETE)5/14/2010 9:25:02 AM
SUMMER 2010] SEARCH QUERY PRIVACY 171
court to grant the government a 90-day delay of the notice if
notification would result in "(A) endangering the life or
physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C)
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of
potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation or unduly delaying a trial." 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2),
(b). What the majority leaves out is the fact that while the
government was initially granted a 90-day delay before being
required to notify Warshak of its searches of his email accounts,
when the 90 days expired, the government ignored the statute
and failed to notify Warshak of its searches. Over a year went
by before Warshak became aware that his emails had been
searched. While members of this Court may argue over
whether or not the delayed notification section of the Stored
Communications Act is constitutional, it is uncontroverted that
the government violated the law by failing to notify Warshak 90
days after searching his emails.
The fact that the government was unable to abide by an
arguably unconstitutional provision of the Stored
Communications Act informs any analysis of Warshak's motion
for preliminary injunction. Not only is Warshak alleging that
the delayed notification provision of the act is unconstitutional,
but he is also alleging that the government cannot be trusted to
abide by the actual requirements of that law as written.
If the goal of the search engines is to retain data, then they
certainly are not helping to make that happen with terms of service
that do not guarantee an expectation of privacy to their users.
Beyond what may be provided as a result of market forces and public
pressure, the E.U. is demanding adequate privacy protection. If they
cannot get it through adequate safeguards, perhaps they are right in
demanding data destruction. It seems that in this regard, the search
engines are working against their own interests.
The government is also working against its own interests. By
legislating exceptions to the warrant requirement, by ignoring
protections that exist during investigations and prosecutions, and by
refusing to declare such activities unconstitutional, the government
may well force deletion of data that they would otherwise be able to
use down the road. The result of cases like Wayshak may be a
hesitancy to leave data with service providers. And beyond that, it
shows to the world that the U.S. does not take privacy seriously -
leaving data destruction as the only viable solution to privacy
73. Warshak v. U.S., 532 F.3d 521 534-5 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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protection. This is counterproductive to law enforcement and
national security if the data are useful for those purposes. Similarly,
users who do not adamantly demand privacy in their terms of service,
transparent cookie usage, and clear safeguards, give courts reason to
say that there is no expectation of privacy. That is contrary to their
interest. Even the potential for jurisdictional over-reaching 7, if true,
is potentially counter-productive - if a country with strong privacy
protection can over-reach, so can a country with weak privacy
protection.
A framework of adequate privacy protection is a reasonable
alternative to data destruction. Anything less invites purging of data
that is invaluable to all stakeholders.
V. Conclusion
Taken individually, each argument presented here has various
strengths and weaknesses. However, two points can probably be
made safely. First, there are clearly issues other than privacy that are
impacted by anonymization, whether forced or not. These include
the loss of potentially useful data, the benefits of repurposing, data
ownership, and more. Justifying anonymization solely in the name of
privacy ignores the trade-offs being made for a less than ideal
solution. Second, when taken as a whole, these arguments tend to
reinforce each other such that their combination is more convincing.
They serve to question the reasonableness of anonymization as a
privacy solution, at least to the degree that other methods should be
examined more closely.
Protecting privacy is important, necessary, and possible.
Hopefully it can be done with full recognition of the value of search
query data. A balanced approach would minimize unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive data, allow for the myriad benefits of long-term
storage, and serve each stakeholder's best interests.
VI. Appendix - Data Protection Schemes
In contrast to search queries, where identifying or partially
identifying information is apparently deemed to be unimportant
enough that its deletion is acceptable, the perceived necessity of long
term retention of many other types of data is different. For example,
medical data are taken to be inherently useful in order "to provide
and promote high quality health care and to protect the public's
74. European Union, supra note 67.
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health and well being." Similarly, "accurate credit" information is
needed to assure "fair and accurate credit reporting," which is
"essential to the continued functioning of the banking system." As
will be discussed below, the basis for this data retention includes
benefits to the collective, even if at times it is detrimental to the
individual. We review here some of the mechanisms used to protect
both data integrity and confidentiality in other arenas, namely, in the
U.S.: census data, medical data, financial and credit data, and
electronic communications and storage data. We then take a brief
look at the E.U. framework for data protection, leading to the
introduction of the aforementioned WP148 document on search
query privacy.
A. Data Protection in the U.S.
Data protection in the U.S. is comprised of a piecemeal
collection of various acts, regulations, and standards. One difference
between these approaches is whether the information is available
outside the controlling authority at all (e.g., no for census data, yes for
medical and financial data), and, if so, whether a search warrant is
needed to access it (e.g., yes for electronic communications).
Another difference is whether the data are available to third parties
involved in the initial activity for which the data were collected (e.g.,
medical data available to health insurance companies for purposes of
payment), or available to sell to third parties without permission of
the individual (e.g., financial data where no "opt out" notice has been
signed). Some statutes specifically require training regarding
confidentiality (e.g., medical data), and some provide for criminal
penalties for giving data to unauthorized persons (e.g., medical data,
census data).
The purpose of this brief introduction to U.S. data protection is
to build up intuition for the relationship between the perceived
sensitivity of the information and the level of protection required.
Without stating it directly, the patchwork of U.S. data protection
legislation is somewhat consistent with the general provision
described in the E.U. Directive 95/46/EC for the relationship between
data sensitivity and its corresponding requisite security:
75. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights,
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
76. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(1) (2006).
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Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their
implementation, such measures shall ensure a level of security
appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the
nature of the data to be protected.
This relationship between the level of sensitivity and the degree
of security is discussed in more detail in Section III. Part of the
discussion related to making security commensurate with sensitivity is
whether or not there should be consideration given to the perceived
usefulness or purpose of the data, and, if so, who should decide how
useful the data might be, and to which purpose it may contribute.
Thus, as we review some of the data protection schemes below, it is
worth considering the implied value of the data, and by whom that
value determination is made.
1. Census Data
Under Sections 9 and 214 of Title 13 of the U.S. Code, census
data are held to a rigorous standard of protection, including criminal
liability of fines and imprisonment. The Census Bureau maintains a
Data Protection website that describes the legal, procedural, and
statistical safeguards used to maintain confidentiality." According to
their online catalog, they retain data going back to the colonial times
of the 1790s. Under Section 221, answering census surveys is
mandatory. According to the Census Bureau's FAQ (Frequently
Asked Questions), census data seem to be stored in their entirety but
released only in aggregate, and the data are not allowed to be
released to other government agencies or third parties in raw form.
2. Medical Data
Medical information stored with health care providers, health
plans, and health care "clearinghouses," as well as their relevant
business associates, is often intended to be kept at least for the life of
the patient, but under a relatively high level of privacy protection."
77. Council Directive 95/46, art. 17(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
78. U.S. Census Bureau, Data Protection and Privacy Policy, http://www.census.gov/
privacy/data-protection/how we-protect-your information.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2010).
79. U.S. Census Bureau, Census Product Catalog, Reference, http://www.census.gov/
mp/www/cat/reference/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
80. U.S. Census Bureau, Question and Answer Center, http://ask.census.gov/cgi-
bin/askcensus.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p faqid=781 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
81. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
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Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act ("HIPAA") in 1996:
A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to assure that individuals'
health information is properly protected while allowing the flow
of health information needed to provide and promote high
quality health care and to protect the public's health and well
being. The Rule strikes a balance that permits important uses of
information, while protecting the privacy of people who seek care
and healing. Given that the health care marketplace is diverse,
the Rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive to cover
the variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed.82
Thus at least in the case of medical data, the government
recognizes not only the need to balance use with privacy protection,
but also that the data has many uses that need to be accommodated.
The rules are designed to prevent data abuse while allowing
reasonable use:
Under the patchwork of laws existing prior to adoption of
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, personal health information
could be distributed-without either notice or authorization-
for reasons that had nothing to do with a patient's medical
treatment or health care reimbursement. For example, unless
otherwise forbidden by State or local law, without the Privacy
Rule patient information held by a health plan could, without
the patient's permission, be passed on to a lender who could
then deny the patient's application for a home mortgage or a
credit card, or to an employer who could use it in personnel
decisions. The Privacy Rule establishes a Federal floor of
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of medical
information.
The rules accommodate use for medical reasons while blocking
non-medical use. This is a broad interpretation of the purpose for
which the data are collected, and is not limited to direct patient care.
For example, nothing in the rules forbids a health provider from
looking over data in the aggregate to investigate treatment success.
82. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights,
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (emphasis
added).
83. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Why is the HIPAA Privacy
Rule needed?, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/about/188.html (last visited Apr.
23, 2010).
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The protected information is described as follows:
The Privacy Rule protects all "individually identifiable health
information" held or transmitted by a covered entity or its
business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic,
paper, or oral. The Privacy Rule calls this information
"protected health information (PHI)." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
"Individually identifiable health information" is information,
including demographic data, that relates to:
- the individual's past, present or future physical or mental
health or condition,
- the provision of health care to the individual, or
- the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
health care to the individual,
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a
reasonable basis to believe it can be used to identify the
individual. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.8
Note that in this case, there must be at least a reasonable basis in
believing that the information can be tied to an individual. This
stands in contrast to search query data, where some have argued that
any possibility of associating information with an individual is
sufficient to label it as identifying.
Furthermore, anonymized ("de-identified") medical information
under HIPAA is allowed unrestricted use." Such data are defined as
"information that does not identify an individual and with respect to
which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can
be used to identify an individual."" For example, zip code
information must be modified so as not to contain groupings of less
than 20,000 people." HIPAA details the allowable uses of protected
information both with and without the individual's consent."
Furthermore, the Act spells out requirements for data protection,
including company contact personnel responsible for implementing
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Section II(D), supra.
86. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2009).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2009).
88. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(B) (2009).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2009).
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data security and receiving and acting on an individual's request to
see and/or modify his own information."' Companies are required to
mitigate any data security breach, and must "reasonably safeguard"
relevant data.9' The safeguards are more formally described by both
HHS and NIST.92  Finally, HIPAA provides for both civil and
criminal penalties for failure to implement appropriate data security.
Nothing in the Act was found to speak of data deletion, but only of
anonymization of released data prior to unrestricted use.
3. Financial Data
a. Financial Services Modernization Act
One part of the Financial Services Modernization Act
("FSMA"), passed by Congress in 1999, involves the privacy of
financial data. The policy underlying this data protection is that
"each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the
security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal
information."94 Each financial institution is obliged to implement
safeguards for their customer data:
In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section,
each agency or authority described in section 6805(a) of this
title [15] shall establish appropriate standards for the financial
institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards -
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to
the security or integrity of such records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial
harm or inconvenience to any customer.
90. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(a), (b) (2009). See also 45 C.F.R. §164.520(b) (2009).
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c), (f) (2009).
92. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Health Information Privacy,
http://www.dhhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/securityruleguidance.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
93. 42 U.S.C. §1320d-5, -6 (2006).
94. 15 U.S.C. §6801(a) (2006).
95. 15 U.S.C. §6801(b) (2006).
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Enforcement of these provisions are also described in the Act,
and does not include criminal liability." Although most of the
"nonpublic personal information" may be shared with (i.e. sold to)
third parties if a customer does not "opt out", account numbers are
not allowed to be shared for marketing purposes regardless.9
b. Fair Credit Reporting Act
In addition to the FSMA protection of financial data, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") regulates credit information and the
nationwide credit reporting agencies. The goal of the Act is to assure
fair and accurate consumer credit reporting, with "respect for the
consumer's right to privacy" using "reasonable procedures"
performed "in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information."9 For example, all consumers are
allowed to obtain a free annual credit report from each of the three
major credit reporting agencies.9
The FCRA limits how credit information may be used (e.g.,
legitimate credit checks, court orders, etc.).")" It also regulates which
information is allowed or required to be included in a credit report
(e.g., disallowing bankruptcy and litigation information that is too
old)."" Enforcement of these provisions includes civil liability,
including attorney fees, and punitive damages for willful violations.102
Knowing or willful release of a consumer's information to an
unauthorized person can also result in criminal liability. 13 In addition
to direct consumer litigation, civil action can also be brought by
several federal agencies.1014
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the high level of protection
and enforcement of credit information, which includes punitive
damages, criminal liability, and agency enforcement, with the
relatively weaker enforcement provisions and "opt out" mechanism
96. 15 U.S.C. § 6805 (2006).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b), (d) (2006).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
99. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Your Rights: Credit Reporting,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menus/consumer/credit/rights.shtm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010) and
Annual Credit Report, http://www.annualcreditreport.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2006).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2006).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, o (2006).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1681r (2006).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2006).
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of financial information. Identity theft is commonly in the news and
one of the FTC's highest priorities, accounting for hundreds of
thousands of complaints annually in the U.S. alone." Given the cost
of unauthorized financial information disclosure and the desirability
of the data to criminals, perhaps such desirability should be
considered a more important factor in determining the level of data
security required than usefulness or purpose - this approach is more
consistent with threat analysis methodology.""
4. Communications Data
a. Electronic Communications Privacy Act; Stored Communications
Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18
U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., protects communication of individuals from
government surveillance undertaken without a court order, from
being accessed by third parties lacking legitimate authorization to
access the messages, in addition to protection from access by message
carriers, such as ISPs.1 0' As part of the ECPA, the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., "addresses
voluntary and compelled disclosure of 'stored wire and electronic
communications and transactional records' held by third-party
internet service providers ("ISPs").")' As one law review article
described it, "courts, legislators, and even legal scholars have had a
very hard time understanding the method behind the madness of the
SCA. The statute is dense and confusing, and that confusion has
made it difficult for legislators to legislate in the field, reporters to
report about it, and scholars to write scholarship in this very
105. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget
Justification, at 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary09.pdf
("[I]dentity theft remains on top of the FTC's list of consumer complaints, accounting for
more than 34 percent of the 728,765 complaints (not including Do Not Call Registry
complaints) filed in FY 2007.").
106. One of the major steps in analyzing a system's security is, understandably,
identifying potential threats. See, e.g., J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman, and Blaine Wastell,
Threat Modeling Web Applications, May 2005, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
ms978516(v=MSDN.10).aspx.; Syed Naqvi and Michel Riguidel, Threat Model for Grid
Security Services, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 1048.
107. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,2516, 2517 (2006).
108. Wikipedia, Stored Communications Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored
CommunicationsAct. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703 (2006).
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important area."" Let this article be no exception. However, it's
worth noting that the SCA is oriented toward communication in
"temporary, intermediate storage" or stored "by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection.".. While
the SCA may include various protections against government access
of a user's email stored at a search engine (e.g., gmail, hotmail, yahoo
mail, etc.), it probably does not extend to search query logs.
The ECPA is an extension of the Federal Wiretapping Act,
protecting communications in transit, though "the Circuits that have
addressed the issue have agreed that the definition of 'intercept'
'encompasses only acquisitions contemporaneous with transmission.'
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003).".... The
SCA protects stored communications such as email. Some divergence
of opinion exists between the circuit courts regarding the temporary
storage of email while in transit as to whether it can be considered
simultaneously in transit and in storage. See U.S. v. Councilman,112
and Bailey"' for an explanation of the ambiguity of the statutes and
the differences between the circuits. One interesting issue raised in
Bailey is the following:
However, as a point of clarification, Stored Communications
Act protection does not extend to emails and messages stored
only on Plaintiff's personal computer. In re Doubleclick Inc.,
154 F.Supp.2d 497, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("the cookies'
residence on plaintiffs' computers does not fall into §
2510(17)(B) because plaintiffs are not 'electronic
communication service' providers.").
Thus is seems that cookies are included as part of the
communication regulations, though not the ones on a user's
computer. That is, assuming that search engines might be considered
an "electronic communication service" provider, it might be
considered illegal for them to share such information with third
parties.
109. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208,1208 (2004).
110. Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1204-05 (S.D. Cal. 2008)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)).
111. Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6,2008).
112. U.S. v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
113. Bailey, 2008 WL 324156, at *6.
114. Id.
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That being said, the ECPA and SCA require search warrants for
most types of governmental access to electronic communication such
as email, with exceptions under section 2703(d) for ongoing
investigations."5 In terms of the overall discussion of U.S. data
protection, these statutes are representative of some of the highest
levels of restrictions, where applicable, in requiring warrants for some
types of data access. Such restrictions are one way to protect against
intrusion into sensitive information such as search query data.
B. Data Protection in the E.U.
As mentioned in the Introduction, data protection in the E.U. is
structured around Directive 95/46/EC, the so-called "Data
Protection" directive."' While details of the directive are discussed
elsewhere in this article, the overall framework is quite general. "
Other related directives include Directive 2002/58/EC, regarding "the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector""' and Directive 2006/24/EC "on
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or
of public communications networks.""9 These last two directives
regulate electronic communications, similar in scope to the ECPA
and SCA in the U.S.
1. European Directive 95/46/EC and the Article 29 Working Party
Report WPl48
The Data Protection Directive introduces several concepts
relevant to the discussion of data protection and information privacy.
For example, a "data subject" is the person described or identified by
the data, such as in the case of someone's social security number. A
"data controller" is the person who has control over the physical data,
such as the owner of a database. A "data processor" is any entity that
is involved with processing the data, which may be, for example, a
third party hired by the data controller. Finally, the "data purpose"
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (Supp. 2009). See further discussion of the warrant issue in
Section IV, supra, quoting from Warshak v. U.S., 532 F.3d at 527, 534-35 (en banc).
116. For the E.U.'s official privacy directives, see Justice and Home Affairs: Data
Protection, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2010).
117. See, e.g., "Data Protection in the European Union," http://ec.europa.eu/justice
home/fsj/privacy/docs/guide/guide-ukingdom-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
118. Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 OJ. (L 201) 37 (EC).
119. Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC).
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constitutes the reason that the controller collected the data about the
data subject.
As mentioned in the introduction, Directive 95/46/EC authorized
the creation of the Article 29 Working Party advisory committee.
This committee consists of representatives of E.U. member countries
and issues various opinions and reports on an as-needed basis. One
such particularly relevant report, as discussed, is WP148, from 2008,
which presents a comprehensive overview for the case of search query
anonymization. The report concludes that search query data should
be anonymized within six months.
